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The Colorado rule differs from the ABA
Both the University of Denver College of
Law and the University of Colorado Law Model Rule on student practice and the stuSchool have active student law clinics. Law dent practice rules of many other states in
students in these clinics receive academic that it does not specifically require in-court
credit for representing indigent clients under supervision by a licensed attorney or certifithe supervision of a faculty member or staff cation of a student by a law school dean.3
Despite the statutory and rule authority
attorney.'
Students in the two clinics are permitted for student representation, however, there is
to practice in the Colorado courts pursuant sometimes disagreement on the part of
to one of the nation's most liberal student judges, city and district attorneys, and pripractice rules. C.R.S. 1973, § 12-5-116 vate practitioners who may find themselves
provides:
working with students on a case as to the
legal status of the student practitioner. This
Students of any law school which has
is to be expected in light of the breadth of the
been continuously in existence for at
student rules and the lack of specific guideleast ten years prior to April 23, 1909,
lines contained in them.
and which maintains a legal-aid dispenMoreover, many of the problems in stusary where poor persons receive legal
dent practice go beyond the rules themadvice and services shall, where represelves. Important constitutional questions
senting said dispensary and its clients
concerning the legal status of student pracand then only, be authorized to appear
tice, particularly in criminal cases, have
in court as if licensed to practice law. 2
been raised in other jurisdictions. 4 The
Rule 226 of the Colorado Rules of Civil manner in which these questions are reProcedure further provides that students in a solved may have an important impact on
clinic maintained by an accredited Colorado student practice in Colorado and affect the
law school are authorized to appear in dis- procedures for student practice followed in
trict, county and municipal courts of the the Colorado courts. Failure on the part of
state as if licensed to practice, "provided judges, city attorneys and supervising attorsuch representation shall be with the ap- neys to follow those procedures may result
proval of the lawyers in charge of the said in constitutional and other challenges to stulegal aid clinic and the judge of the court in dent representation similar to those made in
which the student appears."
other states .
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RATIONALE OF THE
STUDENT CLINIC
The law school clinic is the law school's
answer to such critics of legal education as
Chief Justice Burger, who has observed:
The shortcomings of today's law graduate lies not in any deficient knowledge
of law but that he has little, if any training in dealing with facts or people-the
stuff on which the cases are really
made, 6
and
Law students can deal with a corporate
spin-off, or a vertical merger, but they
don't know enough to save a client from
a fast talking encyclopedia salesman. 7
Indeed, there has been a call for practical
training in the law schools ever since Jerome
Frank in 1933 observed that "the trouble
with much law school teaching is that, confining its attention to a study of upper court
opinions, it is hopelessly oversimplified
. . . (T)he law schools should get in intimate

contact with what clients need and what
courts and lawyers actually do. "8 The purpose of the modem law school clinic is to do
just that.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
The University of Denver College of Law
student law clinic, established in 1904, was
the nation's first. 9 Although it was another
forty years before other states began to follow Colorado's lead, by 1978 forty-four
states had adopted some sort of student practice rule.' 0
An important boost to student practice
came in the right to counsel case of Argersinger v. Hamlin, in which Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart,
stated: "I think it plain that law students can
be expected to make a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the
representation of the poor in many areas
including cases reached by today's decision. "II

By 1979, largely due to the adoption of

July

student practice rules by the majority of
states and the increased support for clinical
education by the Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility
("CLEPR"), 2 approximately 80 percent of
the ABA-approved law schools offered
some form of clinical education.' 3
With the rapid expansion of student law
clinics around the country, it was inevitable
that constitutional questions concerning the
legal status of student lawyers would arise.
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to have the assistance of counsel

for his defense. " The U.S. Supreme Court
has held that the right to counsel is jurisdictional.14 In Powell v. Alabama,'I it was
held that a failure of a state court to provide
effective assistance of counsel for an indigent in a capital case was a denial of due
process. The Court in Betts v. Brady'6 declined to extend the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to the states in non-capital cases.
However, Betts was reversed in Gideon v.
Wainwright,'" which extended this right to
counsel to the states via the Fourteenth
Amendment. Finally, in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 8 the Court extended the right to
counsel to misdemeanor cases in which incarceration was imposed.
The adoption of a yardstick based on incarceration actually "imposed, "19 rather
than "authorized, " created a new problem.
In applying the Argersinger yardstick,
(T)he trial judge and the prosecutor
(must) engage in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether
there is a significant likelihood that, if
the defendant is convicted, the trial
judge will sentence him to ajail term. 20
The Argersinger "predictive analysis"
raises a classic chicken and egg problem for
the student attorney. There is usually no
practical way for a student attorney to know
in advance if a jail sentence will ultimately
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be imposed on the client in an average misdemeanor case and therefore to know if the
client is entitled to Sixth Amendment counsel. Thus, if the student is deemed to have
provided Sixth Amendment counsel, the
judge is free to impose a jail sentence. If, on
the other hand, the student's appointment is
deemed not to be in satisfaction of the Sixth
Amendment, no jail sentence can be imposed. The question of whether student representation meets Sixth Amendment requirements is therefore critical. 2 1 The resolution of this issue, however, is only possible if a judge makes a determination of the
legal status of the student's representation as
a matter of record.
CHALLENGES TO STUDENT
REPRESENTATION
In the recent California case of People v.
Perez,22 the defendant represented by a
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supervised law student was convicted of a
felony. Perez appealed on the grounds that
he had not been represented by counsel in
accordance with Sixth Amendment requirements. The California Court of Appeals noted that while the student was
supervised by a licensed attorney, the attorney did not directly participate in the trial
and, therefore, the supervisor's interest was
not of a "continuing and substantial nature. "23 Although Perez had signed a form
waiving his right to Sixth Amendment counsel,24 the court rejected the waiver on the
grounds the record itself did not show that
Perez "intelligently and understandingly"
waived this right. 25
The Court of Appeals also held that student representation in a felony case did not
meet the Sixth Amendment requirements of
"adequate" counsel because the student
lacked experience and training, and his
"moral standards . . . (were) largely un-
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known" due to lack of a certification procedure. Moreover, the court found the student
to be engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law since the rule under which the student
was practicing had never been approved by
the California Supreme Court.
The California Supreme Court reversed, 26 holding that (1) the student's representation under the in-court supervision of
a licensed attorney constituted Sixth
Amendment representation; (2) the written
waiver was therefore not necessary to meet
Sixth Amendment standards, but needed
only to meet the waiver requirements of the
student practice rule; (3) absent allegations
that the student's representation was incompetent, Sixth Amendment effective assistance standards were met; and (4) the issue of
unauthorized practice was inapplicable absent any indication of moral irresponsibility
or actual prejudice to the defendant. Despite
the happy ending for the cause of student
representation in California, the serious
challenges raised in Perez should be looked
at in the context of the practice of law by
students in Colorado.
Sixth Amendment
In light of the fact that there is no Colorado case on the question of whether student representation can meet Sixth Amendment requirements, it is recommended that a
jtudge be asked at the time of appointment of
student counsel to make a statement on the
record as to whether the client is entitled to
Sixth Amendment counsel and whether the
student is being appointed as Sixth Amendment Counsel. This will enable the student
to advise the client of his or her exposure to
incarceration. It will also avoid the problem
at sentencing as to whether the judge is free
to impose a jail sentence. City and county
attorneys will then know where they stand in
any plea bargaining with a student defender.
Waiver
It is recommended that neither the court
nor the student defender rely solely on
waiver of Sixth Amendment rights as the

basis for studen(representation. As the U.S.
Supreme Court cautioned in Escobedo v.
Illinois, " . . . no system of criminal justice can, or should survive if it comes to
depend for its continued effectiveness on the
citizens' abdication through unawareness. "27 One critic of student representation
waivers has noted that such waivers "refrain
from indicating that the indigent has a different choice available, and the harried,
troubled defendant cannot be compelled to
read between the lines." 2 8
Nevertheless, until student representation
is firmly established as meeting Sixth
Amendment counsel requirements in Colorado, a waiver should be required in every
case in which a student is appointed as Sixth
Amendment counsel. Furthermore, recognizing that courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental
rights, 29 the waiver should itself meet Sixth
Amendment requirements by including an
acknowledgement of the nature of student
representation, detailing its advantages and
disadvantages,30 and a statement that the
indigent client has a free choice to demand
licensed counsel. The waiver must be made
intelligently 1 and should appear on the record as part of an oral inquiry by the judge, 32
as well as in the form of a written waiver on
file.
Unauthorized Practice
The problem of unauthorized practice of
students encountered in Perez should not
arise in Colorado as long as students comply
with C.R.C.P. Rule 226. Problems may
arise, however, where a student appointed
by a judge in one court attempts to dispose of
a related case in another court where an
appointment has not been made. A student
wishing to bring an appeal to a level above
the district court should get special authorization from the Colorado Supreme Court in
light of the language of C.R.C.P. Rule 226
limiting student practice to municipal,
county and district courts. Student representation of defendants charged with felonies in
district court, while permitted under the
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rule, is not recommended except in exceptional cases and then only if there is strict
in-court supervision by a licensed attorney.
Student Certificadon
In this author's opinion, a certification
process for student defenders should be established in Colorado. Under such a procedure, a
form of "limited license" would be issued
after due application by the student, upon certification by the dean of the good moral
character of the student, and proof of a gradepoint average showing competence in courses
in areas in which the student will practice,
such as criminal law and procedure and trial
practice. Such a certification process might
prevent Perez-type challenges in Colorado of
student representation based on the "unknown" moral standards of the student.
CONCLUSION
Student representation has a long and established tradition in Colorado. Continued sup-
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port of the Colorado student law clinics by
judges, city and district attorneys, and practitioners will go far in meeting the hope expressed by three U.S. Supreme Court Justices
that law students can be expected to contribute
to the representation of the poor.3 3 At a time of
budget cuts in legal aid funding, that contribution can be even more significant than in the
past.
Until a final determination is made as to the
Sixth Amendment status of student representation, the recommendations in this article may
help to prevent a Perez-type challenge to student representation in Colorado.
NOTES
1. Full-time staff attorneys supervise students
at the University of Colorado. At the University of
Denver College of Law, regular tenure-track faculty
rotate into the clinic on a quarterly basis.
2. See, Pilapil v. Immigration and Nat. Ser-
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vice, 424 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1970), where the court
held that a University of Denver law student practicing under this rule was qualified to act as counsel for
a non-immigrant alien student in a federal deportation hearing.
3. ABA Model Rule m(c) provides that a student be "certified by the dean of his law school as
being of good character and competent legal ability." Section 11(a) provides that where an eligible
law student appears in "any criminal matter in
which the defendant has the right to assignment of
counsel under any constitutional statute or
rule . . . the supervising lawyer must be personally
present throughout the proceedings."
4. For a comprehensive treatment of the legal
status of student representation, see, Hardaway,
"Student Representation of Indigent Criminal Defendants and the Sixth Amendment: On a Collision
Course?" 29, Cleveland State Law Review
(Summer-Fall, 1981), a symposium on clinical
education.
5. See e.g., State v. Daniels, 346 So. 2d 672
(La. 1977); People v. Masonis, 58 Mich. App. 615,
228 N.W.2d 489 (1975); State v. Cook, 84 Wash.
2d 342, 525 P.2d 761 (1974); People v. Perez, 155
Cal. Reptr. 176, 24 Cal. 3d 133, 594 P.2d I (1979).
6. Burger, "The Future of Legal Education,"
ABA, Selected Readings in ClinicalLegal Education (1973), p. 53.
7. Burger, "Quotations," 15 Student Law J.
No. 5 (1970), p. 5.
8. Frank, "Why Not a Clinical Law School?,"
81 Penn. L. Rev. (1933), p. 907.
9. University of Denver College of Law, Advocacy Skills Program Bulletin (1980), p. 3.
10. Klein et al., Bar Admission Rules and Student PracticeRules (BallingerPub. Co.: 1978), pp.
960-969.
11. 407 U.S. 25 (1972) at 41.
12. See, Grossman, "Clinical Legal Education:
History and Diagnosis," 26 Journ. of Leg. Ed.
(1974), pp. 162, 173.
13. CLEPR, Survey andDirectory ofClinical
Legal Education (1978-1979) (1979), p. v.
14. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) at
468:
A Court's jurisdiction at the beginning of
trial may be lost "in the course of proceedings" due to failure to complete the
Sixth Amendment
court-as the
requires-by providing counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain counsel.
15. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
16. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).

July

17. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
18. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
19. Any question as to whether actual rather
than potential incarceration was to be the standard was resolved in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367 (1979). In Scott the defendant was charged
and convicted of shoplifting, which carried a
one-year maximum jail penalty. The court held
that the defendant had no right to appointed counsel since the defendant was not sentenced to a jail
term. But, see, Baldasar v. Illinois, 48 LW 4481
(1980), in which the court overturned a conviction resulting in ajail sentence for theft based on a
prior theft conviction where counsel was not
provided. Justice Powell dissented, complaining
that such a holding created a "hybrid" type of
conviction "valid for the purposes of their own
penalties as long as the defendant receives no
prison term," but "invalid for the purpose of
enhancing punishment upon a subsequent misdemeanor conviction." But, see also, Lewis v.
U.S.,

_

U.S.

,

63 L.Ed 198 (1980), in

which the court upheld a firearm violation of 18
U.S.C.S. § 1202(a)(1) despite the fact that the
underlying state conviction was subject to collateral attack on Sixth Amendment grounds.
20. Supra, note 18 at 42.
21. For an excellent elaboration of other problems resulting from the Argersinger standard,
see, Krantz et al., Right to Counsel in Criminal
Cases (Ballinger Pub. Co.: 1976), pp. 69-117.
Examples are as follows: (1) What are the prosecutor's responsibilities to object to failure to appoint counsel, where such a failure precludes a
jail sentence? (2) Can a court refuse to appoint
counsel where the legislature had mandated a
minimum sentence? (3) How can a judge view
evidence prejudicial to the defendant prior to trial
with a view towards predicting a jail sentence
without jeopardizing at least the appearance of
impartiality at trial?
22. 147 Cal. Reptr. 34 (1978).
23. Id. at 36-37.
24. The defendant's written waiver stated:
I, Carlos Perez consent to allow (the student) to represent me under the direct supervision of (the supervisor), my courtappointed counsel, who will assume personal, professional responsibility in the matter entitled (People v. Perez). This consent
extends to all matters in and outside the
court, these matters being those set out by
the California State Bar as proper for such
certified Law Students to engage in a repre-
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sentative capacity pertaining to the practice
of law.
People v. Perez, 155 Cal. Rptr. 176, 183, n. 12.
n. 12.
25. Supra, note 22.
26. Supra, note 24.
27. 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
28. Monaghan, "Gideon's Army: Student
Soldiers, " 45 B.U.L. Rev. (1965), pp. 4 4 5 , 4 62 .
In some cases where the client is charged with an
offense for which a jail term is likely, the student's best advice might be to refuse to waive
counsel in favor of student representation. The
client will then be entitled to licensed counsel or,
if no counsel is appointed, be ineligible for in-

Ju

carceration.
29. See, Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 38'
(1977).
30. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806
835 (1975), the Supreme Gourt stated that a de
fendant, before waiving counsel and conductinj
his own defense should "be made aware of the
of self
dangers and disadvantages
representation." It is submitted that the same
standard should be required for waivers in favo
of student representation.
31. Supra, note 14.
32. Id. at 465; see also, Charnley v. Cochrar
369 U.S. 506, 515 (1962).
33. See, text at note 11, supra.
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